We further study the keyless authentication problem in a noisy model in our previous work, where no secret setup is available for sender Alice and receiver Bob while there is discrete memoryless channel (DMC) W 1 from Alice to Bob and a two-way noiseless but insecure channel between them. We propose a construction such that the message length over DMC W 1 does not depend on the size of the source space. If the source space is S and the number of channel W 1 uses is n, then our protocol only has a round complexity of log * |S| − log * n + 4. In addition, we show that the round complexity of any secure protocol in our model is lower bounded by log * |S| − log * n − 5. We also obtain a lower bound on the success probability when the message size on DMC W 1 is given. Finally, we derive the capacity for a noninteractive authentication protocol under general DMCs, which extends the result under Binary Symmetric Channels in our previous work.
interested in the information theoretical security, where Oscar has an infinite time complexity. The advantage of this type of system is that the security does not rely on any hardness assumption (such as factoring assumption [27] ).
To achieve authentication, Alice must have some resource that can distinguish herself from Oscar. For example, if Alice and Bob share a common secret [15] , then this secret is such a resource. A signing key of a signature [27] and a private key [5] of a public key encryption scheme are also examples of this resource. We consider the case where an advantageous resource is a better noisy channel for Alice than for Oscar.
Channel noise traditionally plays an undesired role. However, Wyner [30] showed that the channel noise can be used to establish a common secret. Csiszár and Körner [12] generalized this result to a broadcast channel. Since then, key agreement over a noisy channel has been extensively studied [1] , [2] , [6] , [14] , [19] , [23] , [24] . Other secure mechanisms over a noisy channel were also studied; see [9] , [11] , [26] for oblivious transfers and [4] , [8] , [10] , [29] for commitments. Surveys on information theoretical security over noisy channels can be found in [7] and [22] .
A. Related Works
Authentication that uses a noise as an advantageous resource has been studied in the literature but far from being well-studied. Baracca et al [3] studied the physical layer authentication over MIMO fading wiretap channels. They assumed no shared key but an authenticated initialization. Korzhik et al [20] considered an authentication problem over a (noiseless) public discussion channel but with an initialization over noisy channels. Lai et al [21] considered a noisy authentication model with a shared key, where the senderreceiver channel is better than the sender-adversary channel. Our previous work [17] studied a new authentication model, where Alice and Bob share no key. There is a DMC W 1 from Alice to Bob and a DMC W 2 from Oscar to Bob. There is also a noiseless channel between any two of Alice, Bob and Oscar. Oscar can read messages from Alice or Bob. He can also modify messages over the noiseless channel between Alice and Bob. But messages over W 1 can not be tampered. In addition, Oscar can impersonate Alice using channel W 2 . The (in)existence of authentication in this model was characterized in [17] . Given the existence, an efficient construction was proposed. Further, the non-interactive authentication capacity over Binary Symmetric Channels (BSCs) was given. Authentication that tries to remove the noise pollution on the data 1556-6013 © 2015 IEEE. Personal use is permitted, but republication/redistribution requires IEEE permission.
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was studied in the literature. Martinian et al [25] considered an authentication with a legal distortion and Yu et al [28] considered a covert authentication over a noisy channel. This type of work is not our interest as we consider a noise as an advantageous resource to achieve the authentication.
B. Contribution
This paper further studies the keyless authentication problem in the noisy model [17] . We extend the construction in [17] to authenticate a source state of any length using a fixed length n of DMC messages over W 1 , while in [17] , n heavily depends on the size of the source space S. Our price is a round complexity of log * |S| − log * n + 4 while the protocol in [17] has only 3 rounds. However, we show that the round complexity of any secure protocol in our model must be lower bounded by log * |S| − log * n − 5. This shows that our protocol is nearly round optimal. We remark that this lower bound does not contradict the 3-round protocol in [17] as n ≥ log log |S| C there, where C is the Shannon capacity of W 1 . We also obtain a lower bound on the success probability of Oscar. Finally, we obtain the capacity for a non-interactive authentication protocol with general DMCs W 1 , W 2 (which extends of the result in [17] with BSCs W 1 , W 2 ), where the authentication capacity is the maximum achievable ratio log |S| n .
II. PRELIMINARIES
Notions: We list notions that will be used later.
• Random variable is abbreviated as RV. • x n denotes a sequence x 1 , · · · , x n of length n.
• P X is the distribution of X (i.e., P X (x) = P(X = x)). Similarly, P Y |X (b|a) def = P(Y = b|X = a). • T z n (·) for z n ∈ Z n is a distribution over Z with T z n (u) being the fraction of u in z n for any u ∈ Z.
denotes an independent and identical distribution. • Function negl(n) is negligible in n if for any polynomial f (n), lim n→∞ negl(n) f (n) = 0. • log ( j ) x = log · · · log j (x) (i.e., the composition of log function for j times). • log * n is the minimum i such that log (i) n < 2. • Convex hull Cov(S) for a set S of vectors is the set of all possible convex combinations of vectors in S.
Also denote it by (P X , P X ). For distribution P and a compact set of distributions S, let (P, S)= min Q∈S (P, Q).
A. Discrete Memoryless Channel
where W (y|x) = P Y |X (y|x). In this case, we say X and Y are connected by channel W . The channel is discrete
A n-length code C for W : X → Y with source S is described by an encoding scheme f : S → X n and a decoding scheme φ : Y n → S ∪ {⊥}. A decoding result ⊥ denotes a detection of error. For S ∈ S, f (S) ∈ X n is called a codeword. When f (S) is sent over W and received as Y n ∈ Y n , the receiver will decode it to φ(Y n ). If φ(Y n ) = S, an error occurs. The error probability is max S P(φ(Y n ) = S).
B. Typical Sequences
In this subsection, we introduce the notions of typical and conditional typical sequences [13] .
Definition 1: Let X be a RV over X . We say that x n ∈ X n is -typical if |T x n (a) − P X (a)| ≤ |X | for any a ∈ X and whenever P X (a) = 0, it holds that T x n (a) = 0. The set of -typical sequences for X is denoted by T n [X ] . Definition 2: Let X and Y be RVs over X and Y respectively. y n ∈ Y n is conditionally -typical given x n ∈ X n , if |T x n y n (a, b)−T x n (a)P Y |X (b|a)| ≤ |X |·|Y| for all a ∈ X , b ∈ Y and whenever P XY (a, b) = 0, it holds that T x n y n (a, b) = 0. The set of conditionally -typical sequences for Y , given x n , is denoted by T n [Y |X ] (x n ), and also by T n [W ] (x n ) if X and Y are connected by DMC W .
The following is a basic property of typical sequences. The proof can be found in [13, Ch. 2] .
Lemma 1: Let X and Y be RVs over X and Y respectively. Then, there exists constants λ 1 > 0 and λ 2 > 0 such that
when n large enough.
C. Basic Inequalities
The following lemma is from [17] . It essentially states that if the distribution T Z n induced by the output Z n of a DMC W is close to a distribution P, then P must be close to Cov(W ).
Lemma 2: Let P be a distribution over Z. Let Z n be an output of DMC W : X → Z with input X n . If
for some 1 , 2 > 0, then
The next lemma is taken from [18] . It essentially states that if x n andx n has a large distance, then sending x n through a non-redundant DMC W is unlikely to result in an output Y n that is conditionally -typical withx n . Lemma 3: Let Y n be the output of a non-redundant DMC W : X → Y with input X n . Then for any x n ,x n ∈ X n with d H (x n , x n ) = αn, any ∈ (0, α) and α > 0, it holds that
The following lemma is a special case of [18, Lemma 6] .
We now introduce the (v, b, r, λ)-set system in [17] , which is extended from block design [16] .
Here is a rephrase of an existence result proved in [17] .
The above lemma shows that the existence of a set system with b > 512 −4 log v. We now prove that b > log v actually holds for any set system with λ < r. Although this result is not directly used in this paper, it is the main motivation that leads us to the lower bound on the round complexity in Section V.
Proof: For any s ∈ V , define a b-bit string I (s), where the i th bit of I (s) is 1 if and only if s ∈ B i . As any distinct s 1 , s 2 ∈ V simultaneously appear in at most λ < r blocks while each of s 1 , s 2 appears in at least r blocks, it follows that
III. AUTHENTICATION MODEL
In this section, we introduce the noisy authentication model over DMCs in [17] . We will introduce the communication model, the security formalization and the efficiency metric.
In this problem, there are two DMCs: W 1 : X → Z from Alice to Bob and W 2 : Y → Z from Oscar to Bob. Between Alice and Bob, there is a two-way noiseless channel. Alice will use W 1 and the noiseless channel to authenticate a source state to Bob. Oscar is an attacker. He can read messages sent over the two-way noiseless channel and channel W 1 . He can also tamper messages on the two-way noiseless channel. Allowing Oscar to control the noiseless channel is to capture the concern that this channel is neither confidential nor authenticated. Allowing Oscar to see Alice's message over W 1 is to capture the concern that this channel may leak information. One might think that it is unnecessary to let Oscar know the full input of W 1 . However, we prefer this as it simplifies the model and also provides a stronger security guarantee.
After rounds of interactions, Bob can decide whether to accept the authentication. When he accepts, he outputs a source state; otherwise, he outputs a special symbol ⊥. If Bob detects an error before completing the interaction, he outputs ⊥ and aborts immediately. The formal description follows.
A. Communication Model
Let S be the source space, from which Alice draws a source state S for authentication. Let π n be a ν-round authentication protocol with totally n symbols transmitted over channel W 1 . Each party has a basic input and a random input (a uniformly random binary string which is the randomness source in the execution for this party). Alice's basic input is S and random input is r A , while Bob's basic input is empty and random input is r B . If the list of messages a party has received so far is T, then his (or her) next action (e.g., generating a local output, an outgoing message or making a reject/accept decision) is completely determined by his basic input, random input and T. Let A represent Alice and B represent Bob. Then, we use π n (A, r A , T ) to denote Alice's next action function and π n (B, r B , T ) to denote Bob's next action function. Alice and Bob communicate as follows, where n = ν i=1 n i . A-1: Alice computes (X n 1 1 , u 1 ) = π n (A, S, r A ). She sends X n 1 1 over channel W 1 and u 1 over the noiseless channel, to Bob. Oscar will see X n 1 1 , Z n 1 1 and u 1 . He can modify u 1 to u 1 . Bob will receive Z n 1 1 from channel W 1 and u 1 from the noiseless channel. B-1: Upon Z n 1 1 , u 1 , Bob computes and sends v 1 = π n (B, r B , Z n 1 1 , u 1 ) to Alice over the noiseless channel. Through Oscar, Alice will receive v 1 .
. . .
. He sends X n i i over channel W 1 and u i over the noiseless channel. Oscar will see X n i i , Z n i i and u i . He can modify u i to u i . Bob will receive Z n i i from channel W 1 and u i from the noiseless channel. B-i : Upon Z n i i , u i , Bob computes and sends v i = π n (B, r B , Z n 1 1 |u 1 |Z n 2 2 |u 2 | · · · |Z n i i |u i )
to Alice over the noiseless channel, which, through Oscar, becomes v i . . . .
for S ∈ S ∪ {⊥}, where S =⊥ means that he rejects the authentication while S =⊥ means that he agrees that S is authenticated from Alice. If Alice (or Bob) detects any inconsistency before the protocol completion, she (or he) can reject and abort the execution immediately. The message flows are depicted in Fig. 1 . Since messages in each (A-i , B-i ) have the same structure (except v i is not there when i = ν), we only present one case.
Note that by setting n i = 0, our model allows Alice to send nothing over channel W 1 at some step. Similarly, setting u i (or v i ) as an empty string allows Alice (or Bob) to send nothing over the noiseless channel at Step i .
B. Security Model
The security model is described in terms of two attacks. In a type I attack, Oscar can change the messages over the two-way noiseless channel between Alice and Bob. He succeeds if Bob accepts a source state that is different from Alice's input. In a type II attack, Oscar can impersonate Alice to authenticate a source state using W 2 and a noiseless channel. He succeeds if Bob accepts his authentication. The formal description is as follows. Admissible Attacks:
I. During the execution of π n between Alice and Bob, Oscar can see (X n i i , Z n i i , u i ) from Alice and v i from Bob. He can modify u i to any u i and v i to any v i . He succeeds if Bob outputs S ∈ {S, ⊥}. II. Oscar can impersonate Alice to execute π n with Bob, except that the noisy channel W 1 is replaced by W 2 .
He succeeds in this attack if Bob outputs S =⊥ . We use succ to denote a success event in a type I or II attack.
Security Definition: In this paper, we assume by default that an honest Alice (or Bob) follows the protocol with a random input that is a uniformly random binary string. However, we also consider an honest Alice or Bob who follows the protocol specification with some r ∈ {0, 1} * as the random input. In this case, we call her (or him) an admissible user. Now the security consists of two properties: correctness and authentication. The correctness requires that if an admissible Alice authenticates S to Bob when no attack is performed, Bob should output S = S. The authentication requires that Oscar will never succeed in a type I or II attack.
Definition 4: An authentication protocol π n for source S is -secure if it satisfies two properties.
• Correctness. For any admissible Alice, Bob outputs S = S only negligibly (in n) if no attack is performed. • Authentication. For any Oscar, Pr(succ) ≤ .
Note that here we require the correctness error to be negligible (see Section II) as this is the widely accepted quantity for a probabilistic event that is unlikely to occur.
C. Authentication Rate and Authentication Capacity
We regard the noisy channel as an expensive resource and the noiseless channel as a cheap source. So we are interested in maximizing the efficiency of channel W 1 and define the authentication rate of π n as the ratio log |S| n . The model with (W 1 , W 2 ) has an authentication capacity C a , if for any r < C a , there exists a protocol π n that is n -secure for a negligible n while no such protocol exists when r > C a .
IV. OUR AUTHENTICATION PROTOCOL
In this section, we will construct a new protocol. Our strategy is basically to extend the 3-round protocol in [17] . The number n of channel W 1 uses in [17] satisfies n = (log log |S|), where S is the source space. In our new protocol, n does not depend on |S| but with the price that the round complexity is log * |S| − log * n + 4. This reduces the use of the noisy channel by trading to the round complexity.
A. The Idea of Our Protocol
We now outline the idea of our protocol. As it is extended from the 3-round protocol [17] , we start with the idea of the latter. This protocol is based on a set system (S,
Alice first sends the source state S ∈ S to Bob noiselessly. Bob then finds all possible i 's such that S ∈ B i and picks up a random B j among them and sends j to Alice noiselessly. Finally, Alice encodes j and sends it over DMC W 1 to Bob. The construction is designed such that if Oscar modifies S to S , then a successful type I attack implies S , S ∈ B j , which is unlikely due to the property of the set system.
Our protocol stems from [17] with the following idea. Essentially, Alice still tries to authenticate S with a set system (S, B 1 , · · · , B b ). However, she does not send j over W 1 . Instead, she regards j as a new source state in a new but smaller source space S = [b] and tries to use a smaller set system (S , B 1 , · · · , B b ) to authenticate j . It is important that by Lemma 5, b can be the order of log |S|. Similarly, b can be the order of log b, which in turn has the order of log log |S|. So to authenticate j , Alice now only needs to send a DMC message from a domain of size b = log log |S| (instead of size b = log |S|). That is, two iterations of the protocol [17] allow to decrease DMC message to the log size. Conceivably, if we iterate it for L times, then the DMC message will reduce to a domain size log (L) |S|. Thus, if we set the DMC message length as n, then we only need to iterate the protocol [17] for log * |S| − log * n + O(1) times (by the fact: if L ≤ log * m, then log * m = L + log * (log (L) m)). This is almost our desired result. We now implement this idea rigorously.
B. The Actual Construction
Now we present our construction. The formal description is in Fig. 2 . For better understanding, we also outline the message flows in Fig. 3 . In our protocol, φ is an even integer (to be determined later) and a is any fixed element in X s.t. (W 1 (·|a), Cov(W 2 )) = γ > 0 (the existence of a is guaranteed under the necessary condition Cov(W 1 ) ⊆ Cov(W 2 ) of authentication; see [17] ). Other parameters are listed below.
-C: Shannon capacity of channel W 1 ;
for v j ∈ N (its parameters will be determined later); -S 1 : The source space S 1 = [v 1 ]; -s 1 : The source state to be authenticated by Alice; -C = {C 1 , · · · , C 2 n R }: a code of rate R for W 1 ; -n : The length of codeword C i (so C i ∈ X n ); -n: Total number of channel W 1 uses; n = n + √ n ;
Remark: Note that in the communication mode at Section III-A, The message of Alice at Step A-i always has a form of (X n i i , u i ). However, in our protocol, Alice either only sends u i or only sends X n i i . As remarked at the end of communication model, this is permitted by setting n i = 0 or u i as an empty string. In our protocol, channel W 1 is only used at Step 2.
C. Security Analysis
Now we analyze the security of our protocol. We start with a preparation lemma (see Appendix A for a proof). Then, we show that it is authenticated against two types of attacks.
. This lemma implies the following corollary with j = k.
Our security theorem below assumes the following results:
-For any R < C, there exists a code C of rate R for W 1 with an exponentially small error in n (see [13] ).
Then, SetAuth * is a 2 −ξ √ n -secure authentication protocol for a constant ξ > 0 with round complexity at most log * v 1 − log * n + 4, where n = n + √ n is the number of channel W 1 uses (not dependent on v 1 ).
Proof (Correctness): If Oscar does not perform an attack, then s = s for all . Our setup of {v j } satisfies the condition of Lemma 7 with δ = 2 −9 4 and k = φ − 1. From Corollary 1 and 4β 1 + β 2 < R, we know that v φ < 2 n R when n large enough. Since S φ has a size v φ and C s φ encodes s φ , Bob will decode Z k+n k+1 to s φ with an exponentially small error probability, by the assumption of C. Also, by Lemma 1,
2|Z| for all u ∈ Z is violated with an exponentially small probability. The correctness follows.
Authentication: There are two types of attacks in our model.
Type-I: Oscar revises messages over the noiseless channel between Alice and Bob such that s 1 = s 1 . Type-II: Oscar plays the role of Alice to interact with bob to authenticates, where assume that the message in the iteration in step 1 iss . Further, at step 2, we assume Oscar sendsC * over the channel W 2 to Bob.
For a type I attack, the success probability is upper bounded by P(succ, s φ = s φ ) + P(succ|s φ = s φ ). Let E s φ be the event Z k+n k+1 is not decoded to s φ . As C is a code with an exponentially small error and C s φ is an encoding of s φ ,
for some α > 0 and any s ∈ S. Note that succ event implies that Z k+n k+1 is decoded to s φ , which is a special case of
We now consider case s φ = s φ . In this case, as s 1 = s 1 , there must exist j < φ such that s j = s j but s j +1 = s j +1 . In this case, notice that P j +2 will verify whether s j ∈ B j,s j +1 . We now bound the probability for this to hold. First, observe that the time order for s j , s j , s j +1 = s j +1 is as follows: P j generates s j ; then, Oscar revises it to s j ; next, upon s j , P j +1 generates s j +1 ; finally, P j +2 (= P j ) receives s j +1 = s j +1 . Thus, s j +1 = s j +1 is selected after s j and s j have been fixed. By the definition of s j +1 , it holds that s j ∈ B j,s j +1 . Since P j +2 will verify s j ∈ B j,s j +1 , it follows that a successful attack implies s j , s j ∈ B j,s j +1 . However, as s j +1 is uniformly randomly from {i 1 , · · · , i r }, this probability is at most 2 −.25(φ− j ) , by the property of the set system for S j . Since j can take any value from 1 to φ − 1, it follows that
Hence, a type I attack succeeds with probability at most 2 −n α + 6 , which is exponentially small as = 2 −β 1 n .
For a type II attack, assume Bob receives Z n +k . We claim
Otherwise, by Lemma 2,
This is impossible, as (W 1 (·|a); Cov(W 2 )) = γ . This completes the proof of the authentication by defining ξ < γ 2 8|Z| 2 . Finally, as log * v 1 = φ + log * (log (φ) v 1 ) and log log(β 2 n) < log (φ) v 1 ≤ n by definition of φ, we have φ ≤ log * v 1 − log * n + 3 (using 2 β 2 n ≥ n) for n large enough. This gives the round complexity.
V. LOWER BOUND ON THE ROUND COMPLEXITY
In this section, we prove a lower bound on the round complexity of an authentication protocol in our model. Our strategy is to reduce the problem to a special class of protocols, where the first round is the source state and the final round only consists of a DMC message which is sent only in the final round. Then, we bound the round complexity of the latter.
A. Preparation Lemmas
In this subsection, we reduce the round complexity problem to two special types of protocols: in the first type, the final round consists of only a DMC message which is sent only in the final round; in the second type, the first round is the source state. We will achieve each reduction with one lemma.
Special Protocol Set 1 : We define 1 to be the set of authentication protocols in our model such that the DMC message over W 1 is sent only in the final flow and the final flow has no message over the noiseless channel.
In the following, we show that if there is an L-round secure authentication protocol in our model, there exists a secure L -round protocol in 1 with L ≤ L + 2. Our idea is that we can move each DMC message X n i in the original protocol to the noiseless channel of the same flow and in addition also send X n i over DMC W 1 in the final flow. This modification needs to be careful: the original protocol could use the DMC output Y n i right after Bob has received it while the modified protocol only has the noiseless version X n i (instead of Y n i ). Fortunately, this can be fixed by permitting Bob to simulate Y n i (letting X n i go through a statistical model that has the same characteristics as channel W 1 ), where X n i is the received version of X n i by Bob over the noiseless channel. However, this causes a new problem: it is possible that X n i = X n i . To overcome this, we actually send X n i in the final flow using an error-correcting code, through which Bob can obtain X n i with high probability. Further, X n i is coded such that if X n i = X n i , then the change can be detected. The lemma is as follows; see Appendix B for a proof.
Lemma 8: If there exists an L-round -secure authentication protocol π in our model, then there exists an L -round ( + 2 −βn )-secure authentication protocol π ∈ 1 with n = μn for L ≤ L + 2 and some constants β > 0, μ > 0, where n , n are respectively the numbers of channel W 1 uses in π , π.
In the following, we show that we can always assume the first flow of the protocol is the source state S over the noiseless channel from Alice. The idea is, the source state is not confidential and hence the authentication property does not depend on its secrecy. Thus, if it is not sent in the first flow, we can prepend it to the protocol. See Appendix C for details.
Lemma 9: Let π be an L-round -secure authentication protocol in our model for source space S. Let π be an authentication protocol obtained from π as follows:
• The first flow of π is the source state S over the noiseless channel from Alice; • If the first flow in π is from Alice, then the second flow of π is a constant 0 over the noiseless channel from Bob; • After the preliminary flow(s) above, Alice and Bob start to execute π normally with S as Alice's input in π.
Then, π is a L -round -secure protocol with L ≤ L + 2.
B. The Lower Bound Theorem
In the following, we will prove our lower bound on the round complexity. Our proof mainly considers a special protocol * below (the general case will be handled at the end of the theorem). We start with notions used in the proof. Then, we outline the proof idea. Finally, we give the theorem proof.
Notations: We will use the following notions or parameters.
• * : The set of the special authentication protocols we mainly consider. In a protocol π ∈ * , the first flow is the source state S over the noiseless channel from Alice while the final flow is a DMC message over W 1 from Alice and a DMC message is only sent in the final flow. • ⊥: denote the reject decision by Alice or Bob. • M j (u j −1 ): The set of choices for the j th flow when the first j − 1 flows are u j −1 . Formally, u j ∈ M j (u j −1 ) if and only if there exists a random tape r for U (either Alice or Bob) such that the list of outgoing messages of U in the reverse order (given incoming messages u j −1 , u j −3 , · · · ) are u j , u j −2 , · · · . For convenience, assume that if U rejects, then (s)he aborts with u j =⊥; also assume that if u j −1 =⊥, U rejects. • L: The round complexity of π.
• n: The number of channel W 1 uses. • D(u L−1 ) = (d 1 , · · · , d |X | n +1 ) (binary vector), where d t = 1 if and only if the tth element in X n ∪ {⊥} (sorted in any fixed order) belongs to M L (u L−1 ).
is the i th element in D j (assuming D j is sorted in any fixed order). D j −1 = {D(u j −1 ) | u j −1 over all choices for the first j − 1 flows}. Note:
is an indicator vector for some subset of D j .
Remark: D(u j −1 ) is well defined for all choices of u j −1 (feasible or infeasible in the sense of the definition of M j (u j −1 )). For example, u j −1 with u j −2 =⊥ is infeasible, as this implies Alice (or Bob) will abort after producing u j −2 =⊥ and hence M j (u j −1 ) is an empty set. If u j −1 is infeasible, then D(u j −1 ) = (0, 0, · · · , 0).
Idea for the Lower Bound: Our idea for the lower bound of the round complexity is as follows. By Lemmas 8 and 9, we only need to consider π ∈ * . We first consider such a protocol of 3-round and show that |S| ≤ 2 2 |X | n +1 . Notice that M 3 (u 2 ) ⊆ X n ∪ {⊥}. Now we consider the case where the second flow u 2 is always 0 (constant). In this case, if |S| > 2 |X | n +1 , then there must exist u 1 ,ū 1 such that D(u 1 0) = D(ū 1 0), as they are |X | n + 1 dimensional binary vectors. Then, Oscar can attack π as follows. He first requests Alice to authenticate u 1 and then modifies the first flow u 1 toū 1 but keeps other flows unchanged. Under this attack, Oscar is admissible, as u 3 ∈ M 3 (ū 2 ) from D(u 1 0) = D(ū 1 0). By the correctness of π, Bob will acceptū 1 and hence Oscar succeeds. This contradicts the authentication and hence |S| ≤ 2 |X | n +1 holds. Our foregoing argument is based on the restriction that u 2 is a constant, which is of course not true usually. However, for the general case, we might still wish to use a certain variant of this strategy. Specifically, we may try to argue that if |D 1 | < |S|, then there must exist two source states u 1 ,ū 1 that share the same possible choices for the second flow and the third flow. If this is true, the above attack can go through. Toward this, recall that D 2 denotes the set of all possible D(u 2 ) and that D(u 1 ) = (d 1 , · · · , d |D 1 | ), where d i = 1 if and only if there exists u 2 such that D(u 2 ) is the i th element in D 2 . Notice that |D 2 | ≤ 2 |X | n +1 . Hence, under our treatment, a variant of Oscar's attack above succeeds if the number of all possible D(u) is less than |S| (which is guaranteed if |S| > 2 2 |X | n +1 , or log (2) |S| > |X | n + 1). So the authentication property must imply log (2) |S| ≤ |X | n + 1. For a general L-round protocol, we can generalize the above idea to show that log (L−1) |S| ≤ |X | n +1. From L −1 = log * |S|− log * (log (L−1) |S|), this gives L −1 ≥ log * |S|−log * (|X | n +1), which is almost our desired lower bound. We now implement the idea rigorously.
Theorem 2: Let π be an L-round -secure authentication protocol for source space S. Then L ≥ log * |S| − log * n − 5, where n is the number of channel W 1 uses.
Proof: We first prove a lower bound for π ∈ * . We start with the following claim.
Claim:
Combining these two statements implies the result. Now we claim |S| ≤ |D 1 |; otherwise, we construct an Oscar who breaks the authentication property as follows. Since |S| > |D 1 |, there must exist distinct u 1 ,ū 1 ∈ S such that D(u 1 ) = D(ū 1 ). Then, the code of Oscar is as follows.
• Oscar provides u 1 to Alice as her source state input.
When Alice sends u 1 to Bob noiselessly, Oscar revises it toū 1 and sends it to Bob. • Assume the ( j -1)th flow has been handled and D(u j −1 ) = D(ū j −1 ). We handle the j th flow for j < L as follows.
-If Alice sends u j to Bob for u j ∈ M j (u j −1 ), then by 
and that u L =⊥ if and only ifū L =⊥. Now we analyze the success probability p of Oscar. First of all, Alice is a sender with a uniformly random tape and especially is admissible (see the paragraph before Definition 4). Thus, u j ∈ M j (u j −1 ) for any j . By our analysis in the attack,ū j ∈ M j (ū j −1 ) as well. Thus, by the definition of admissible and the definition of M L (·), Alice is an admissible sender in the execution (Alice , Bob). By correctness of π, Bob will outputū 1 with probability at least 1 − η > , contradicting the authentication property (asū 1 = u 1 ). Thus, |S| ≤ |D 1 |.
Finally, for j < L − 1, recall D j consists of all possible
Thus, log |D j | ≤ |D j +1 | holds for any j ≤ L − 1. Iteratively applying log function, we have that log (L) |D 1 | ≤ log |D L | < 1 + n log |X |. Hence, log (L) |S| ≤ 1 + n log |X |. Thus, log * |S| = L + log * (log (L) |S|) ≤ L + log * (1 + n log |X |). This gives a lower bound on L for π ∈ * .
For the general π, notice that for any L-round authentication protocol π, by Lemma 8 and Lemma 9, there exists an (L + 4)-round ( + 2 −βn )-secure authentication protocol π ∈ * with n = γ n for some constants β > 0, γ > 0, where n and n are respectively the number of channel W 1 uses in π and π . Applying the above proof to π , we conclude that log * |S| ≤ L +4+log * (1+nγ log |X |) ≤ L +4+log * (2 n ) when n large enough. Hence, the theorem follows.
VI. LOWER BOUND ON THE SUCCESS PROBABILITY
In this work, we regard channel W 1 as an expensive resource and try to minimizing its use. However, we show that a shorter message over W 1 implies a larger authentication error. Now we start with the proof idea and then present the result formally.
Our idea is to construct an Oscar with a success probability related to the message length over W 1 . Essentially, when Alice is authenticating S to Bob, our Oscar blocks the communication between Alice and Bob. In addition, Oscar plays the role of 'Bob' to interact with Alice. Meanwhile, Oscar starts an independent session to play the role of 'Alice' to authenticate a new message S to Bob, except that he uses Alice's DMC messages as his own. Here two authentication sessions are independent, except that they use the same DMC messages. By calculation, we can show that two independent sessions share the same DMC messages F with probability at least 2 −H (F ) . When this occurs, Bob will accept S , unless a correctness error (with probability δ) occurs. So Oscar succeeds with probability at least 2 −H (F ) − δ − 1 |S| , where 1 |S| accounts for the possibility S = S . The formal detail is as follows. Theorem 3: Let π be an -secure authentication protocol in our model for source space S with correctness error δ. Assume F is the concatenation of messages over DMC W 1 by Alice (if some flow does not contain a DMC message, represent it by an empty symbol). Let F be the space of F.
Proof: We now present a strategy for Oscar to achieve the claimed lower bound. Oscar first generates S ← S and then simulates two parties: Alice and Bob to conduct a type I attack (denoted by ) as follows.
• When Alice interacts with Bob for authenticating S ← S, Bob intercepts and blocks all the messages from Alice, except the messages over DMC W 1 . In addition, Bob , in the role of Bob, interacts with Alice faithfully, except that he simulates the output of W 1 using the input from Alice (recall that Oscar can see the input of Alice over W 1 ). In addition, Alice intercepts and blocks all the messages from Bob. She then interacts with Bob faithfully to authenticate S , except that she regards each message over DMC W 1 from Alice as her own message to Bob. In this attack, Oscar succeeds if and only if Bob outputs S (denoted by event Good) and S = S. So P(succ(Oscar)) ≥ P(Good) − P(S = S) = P(Good) − 1/|S|. Now we analyze P(Good). Toward this, we consider a mental variant of with the following difference. -Bob does not use the simulated output of W 1 and instead he can also intercept and block W 1 and use its output. -Alice does not use messages on W 1 from Alice as her own to Bob. Instead, she can send messages directly onto W 1 and Bob receives the corresponding output. In other words, Bob and Alice is changed such that (Alice, Bob ) and (Alice , Bob) maintain two independent protocol executions, where the former is to authenticate S ← S while the latter is to authenticate S ← S.
Let F 1 be the messages over W 1 in execution (Alice, Bob ) and F 2 be the messages over W 1 in execution (Alice , Bob). Observe that a simulated W 1 and a real W 1 have the same statistical characteristics. It follows that, conditional on F 1 = F 2 , and are distributed identically. Let P (E) denote the event E in an experiment . Then,
Further, in , executions (Alice, Bob ) and (Alice , Bob) are independent. Also, F 1 is an event in the execution of (Alice, Bob ) while (Good, F 2 ) is an event in the execution of (Alice , Bob). So F 1 is independent of (Good, F 2 ). Thus, Eq. (5) = a∈F P (Good, F 2 = a)P (F 1 = a) ≥ a∈F P (F 2 = a)P (F 1 = a) − δ / * execution (Alice , Bob) is faithfully according to π and so P (Good) ≥ 1 − δ. * / = a∈F P 2 F (a) − δ, / * F 1 , F 2 are i.i.d. according to the corresponding RV F of a faithful execution of π. * / ≥ 2 −H (F ) − δ, / * log( x P 2 X (x)) ≥ −H (X) as log(x) is concave * / This gives the first conclusion. The second one follows from H (F) ≤ log |F |. This completes the proof.
VII. THE CAPACITY OF NON-INTERACTIVE AUTHENTICATION OVER ANY DMC
In this section, we study a non-interactive authentication in our model: the protocol consists only of one message flow (X n , u) sent from Alice to Bob, where X n is over W 1 and u is over the noiseless channel. The authentication capacity in this setting with BSCs W 1 and W 2 was obtained in [17] . Now we extend this result to general DMCs W 1 , W 2 . We start with the idea of our result and then give the details.
Our idea is as follows. By Lemma 4, there exists a subset C of X n with size |X n(1−δ) | for an arbitrarily small δ > 0 such that any two elements in C has a large distance. By Lemma 3, if we send C i ∈ C over DMC, Bob will not confuse it with C j ∈ C, in the sense of the presence of a type I attack. So C can be used to authenticate a source space of size |X | n(1−δ) against type I attack. A type II attack can be combated using the same idea in SetAuth * . This gives a scheme with an authentication rate of (1 − δ) log |X |. Since δ is arbitrarily small, any rate less than log |X | can be achieved. On the other hand, it is obvious that the rate can not surpass log |X | as the noiseless channel is insecure and hence one codeword over DMC W 1 can authenticate at most one source state.
Theorem 4: The capacity of a non-interactive authentication in our model with W 1 non-redundant and Cov(
Proof (Achievability): For any α ∈ (1/n, 1/2], by Lemma 4, there exists C ⊆ X n such that any two elements in it have distance at least αn and that |C| ≥ |X | 
However, d H (C s , C s ) > αn. By Lemma 3,
exponentially small! Authentication rate is lim n→∞
log |X | ] log |X |. Since α is arbitrarily small, any rate less than log |X | can be achieved.
Converse: Since any point in X n can be a codeword for at most one source s (recall the noiseless channel can be modified arbitrarily), the authentication rate is at most log |X |.
VIII. CONCLUSION
We further studied the keyless authentication problem in [17] . We extended the construction there. If the message space is S and the number of channel W 1 uses is n, then our new protocol has a round complexity log * |S|−log * n+4. Here n can be chosen independent of S while this is impossible in [17] . We proved a lower bound log * |S| − log * n − 5 on the round complexity. We also obtained a lower bound on the success probability. Finally, we showed the capacity for a non-interactive authentication under general DMCs W 1 , W 2 is log |X |, which extends the result under BSCs in [17] . In our work, we assume that W 1 , W 2 are known. Practically, this is not always true. However, if possible, one can estimate them using statistical experiments. Of course, it is certainly interesting to consider the problem when W 1 and W 2 are partially known.
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Proof: The conclusion holds for the initial case j = 0 automatically. Assume it holds for case j −1. Consider case j .
where inequality ( * ) uses the fact that log ( j −1) v 1 ≥ log (k−1) v 1 ≥ 2 3 and that 4x log x ≥ 2x log(2x) for
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Proof: Let π be an L-round -secure authentication protocol. We construct an L -round ( + 2 −βn )-secure authentication protocol π from π as follows, where we assume W 1 (·|a) ∈ Cov(W 2 ) for some a ∈ X . Note that by [17] , a necessary condition for -secure authentication is Cov(W 1 ) ⊆ Cov(W 2 ). Thus, such an a ∈ X with W 1 (·|a) ∈ Cov(W 2 ) must exist.
i. Alice follows π, except whenever she needs to send F over W 1 , she instead sends it over the noiseless channel. ii. Bob follows π, except that whenever he receives F over the noiseless channel (the received version of F, where F is supposedly sent over DMC W 1 in π), he lets it go through a simulated W 1 and regards the output as the DMC output in π and proceeds normally according to π. iii. If the Lth flow in π is from Alice to Bob, then Bob sends 0 as the (L + 1)th flow in π and the (L + 2)th flow will be the final flow; otherwise, the (L + 1)th flow will be the final flow. In any case, the final flow in π is from Alice to Bob and defined as follows. Let (F 1 , · · · , F L ) be the list of messages that are sent over DMC W 1 in π.
Since π uses W 1 for n times, it follows F L ∈ X n . Letn = 2n log |X | C , where C is the Shannon capacity of W 1 (C > 0 is implied by the necessary condition dim W 1 > 1 [17] ). By Shannon capacity theorem, there exists a code C ⊆ Xn over channel W 1 for source M = X n that has an exponentially small error probability (say, 2 −αn for some α > 0). Alice encodes (F 1 , · · · , F L ) to Xn ∈ C and sends an Xn over DMC W 1 in the final flow of π . iv. Let Y 2n be the received vector in the final flow π for an Xn over channel W 1 . Bob will accept if and only if -the original verifications in π are satisfied; -Y 2n n+1 decodes to F L (the received version of F L over the noiseless channel by Bob in π ); -Yn ∈ Tn [W 1 ] .5γ (an) for γ = (W 1 (·|a), Cov(W 2 )). This completes the description of π . Its message flows with reference to π are depicted in Fig. 4 . Now we analyze π . Consider a type I attack first. For any Oscar against π (between Alice and Bob ), we construct Oscar against π (between Alice and Bob). The strategy of Oscar is to maintain a simulated Alice and Bob to execute π with Oscar against it and then mimic the attack strategy of Oscar to attack π. Toward this, the simulation of Alice and Bob will rely on the view of Oscar in the execution of π. Details follow (it is also helpful to refer Fig. 4 by changing Alice, Bob, Oscar in π to Alice , Bob , Oscar ).
-When Alice (or Bob) in π sends M over the noiseless channel, Oscar lets Alice (or Bob ) does the same thing in π and also lets Oscar know M. In addition, whenever Alice sends F i over channel W 1 , Oscar lets Alice in π sends F i to Bob over the noiseless channel. -When Oscar (against π ) changes M to M before the delivery, Oscar (against π) does the same thing. When Oscar changes F i to F i = F i , Oscar aborts immediately; otherwise, Oscar will deliver F i without a change Fig. 4 . Protocol π vs Protocol π : E i is simulated by letting F i go through a statistical model with the transition matrix as W 1 ; Xn is the codeword of F L ; C is the capacity of W 1 ; n is the number of W 1 uses in π ;n = 2n log |X | C (this assures an exponentially small decoding error of Y 2n n+1 ); L is the round complexity of π ; a ∈ X satisfies the distance γ de f = (W 1 (·|a), Cov(W 2 )) > 0; Yn ∼W 1 (·|an ) means that Yn is conditionally typical with an (precisely, Yn ∈ Tn [W 1 ] .5γ (an )).
(recall that Alice in π has sent F i over W 1 ). If Bob in π receives E i over W 1 (when Alice sends F i ), then Oscar lets Bob use E i as the simulated output of W 1 with input F i . Note E i is distributed the same as the simulated E i by Bob in π as they are both according to the statistic model W 1 . -In the final round of π , Oscar simulates Alice and Bob to act normally. He lets Oscar know the input an Xn and output Y 2n of DMC W 1 . Denote the attack of Oscar by . Note that the view of Oscar in is according to the distribution in a real attack. It suffices to bound the success (denoted by succ ) of Oscar in . Thus, P(succ ) = P(succ , F i = F i , ∃i ) + P(succ , F L = F L ).
Note if (F 1 , · · · , F L ) = (F 1 , · · · , F L ), succ implies a decoding error for Y 2n n+1 , which is upper bounded by 2 −αn for some α > 0 (as the information rate log |X | n n ≤ C/2 < C). Further, when (F 1 , · · · , F L ) = (F 1 , · · · , F L ), the success of Oscar in π implies the success of Oscar in π, which is upper bounded by due to our assumption for π. Hence, P(succ ) ≤ 2 −αn + . Now we consider type II attack. In this case, it is similar to the analysis of type II attack in SetAuth * that the success probability of the attacker is upper bounded by 2e −n γ 2 8|Z| 2 . Hence, the success probability of type I, II attacks is upper bounded by = + 2 −αn + 2e −n γ 2 8|Z| 2 . Finally, the number of channel W 1 uses in π is n = 2n = 4n log |X | C . Thus, a value is negligible in n if and only if it is negligible in n. So π is -secure under parameter n . The lemma follows.
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Proof: If there exists an Oscar against π , we construct an adversary Oscar against π. We describe Oscar for type I and II attacks as follows. Assume π is run between Alice and Bob and π is run between Alice and Bob . The strategy of Oscar Fig. 5 . Type I attack: the left figure is the attack of Oscar to π and the right box is π simulated by Oscar who runs Oscar (algorithm) against it. Here · · · A · · · > means that Oscar copies A to the pointed destination. Note that π in the simulated π and π in the left figure are identical. Hence, Oscar authenticates S = S to Bob iff Oscar authenticates S = S to Bob. is to simulate Alice and Bob and run Oscar against the execution of π . W.L.O.G., assume π starts with Alice.
For a type I attack, Oscar does as follows (also see Fig. 5 ).
• When Oscar invokes Alice (in π ) to authenticate S to Bob , Oscar simulates Alice with input S and sends S to Bob , which through Oscar will be delivered to Bob as S . Bob will then send 0 to Alice , which we assume to arrive at Alice as 0 (otherwise, Alice simply rejects). In this case, Oscar invokes Alice (in π) with input S. Further, Oscar simulates Alice and Bob to start π (as a subprotocol of π ) to authenticate S, by strictly following the flows between Alice and Bob. Details follow. • Whenever Alice (or Bob) sends a message C to Bob (or Alice) noiselessly, Oscar simulates Alice (or Bob ) to send C to Bob (or Alice ) noiselessly as well. • Whenever Oscar delivers a message M to Bob (or Alice ), Oscar delivers M to Bob (or Alice) in π as well. • Whenever Alice sends a message X t to Bob over W 1 , Oscar simulates Alice to send X t over (virtual) W 1 as well and informs Oscar about this. When X t in π arrives at Bob as Y t , Oscar delivers Y t to Bob as the output of W 1 and also notifies Y t to Oscar . From the description of Oscar, the view of Oscar is distributed according to the real attack. Also when Oscar successfully authenticates S = S to Bob , Oscar does so to Bob as well, as the execution of π between Alice and Bob and the execution of π between Alice and Bob are identical. Especially, Bob accepts S if and only if Bob accepts S . Thus, Oscar has the same success probability as Oscar .
For type II attack, Oscar's strategy is similar, omitted.
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